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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of ·Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 1696 
HOLLAND SUPPLY CORPORATION, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Defendant in Error. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the 
Supreme Court. of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Holland Supply Corporation, respectfully 
represents : 
That it is aggrieved by a judgment of the Circuit Court 
of Nansemond County rendered at its January, 1935, term, 
in the above-styled action at law, and respectfully petitions 
that a writ of error be awarded it from said judgment en-
tered against your petitioner on the 31st day of January, 
1935, in favor of defendant in error. 
In this petition plaintiff, Holland Supply Corporation, and 
defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany, below, will be referred to as plaintiff and defendant, 
respectively. 
Upon the facts agreed the matter was submitted to the 
Court for its determination and the Court entered up judg-
ment for. defendant, to which action of the Court the plain-
tiff excepted (R., p. 8). 
Defendant assigns the following error : 
That the Court erred in entering up judgment for defend-
ant. 
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BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS AGREED. 
Holland Supply Corporation, the plaintiff, is engaged in 
farm supply'business, at Holland, Virginia, and on May 8th, 
1934, was the owner of a certain automobile truck used in 
. and about its business, and, in the operation of which, it was 
insured by defendant ''against the perils arising from the 
ownership, maintenance or use thereof, against legal liability 
imposed upon the assured resulting solely and directly from 
an. accident by reason of the ownership, maintenance or use 
of'' said truck on account of bodily injuries and/ or suffered 
or alleged to have been suffered by any person, and on ac-
count of damage to property, and to defend in the name of 
the assured any suits which may be brought against the as-
sured by reason of any accident even if such suit is ground-
less, false or fraudulent; and to pay all expense of litigation 
in connection therewith. There is incorporated in the policy 
also the following· provision : ''The Company shall not be 
liable and no liability or obligation of any kind shall attach 
to the Company (Defendant) for losses or damages; (D) 
Unless the said automobile 'is being operated by the assured, 
his paid driver, • * '"' or persons acting with the consent of 
the assured; and (E) caused while said automobile is being 
driven or operated by any person whatsoever, • • * violating 
any law or ordinance as to age or driving.license • • • . '' 
On May 8th, 1934, the regular driver 0f the truck was sick 
and the plaintiff instructed one of its warehousemen, who 
was a thoroughly competent driver, to take the truck to 
Portsmouth for a ·load. While on its way back an accident 
occurred, in which, one, Edward Reid was injured, which 
was reported to and investigated by defendant. Edward 
Reid brought action in the Circuit Court of the City of Ports-
mouth against plaintiff, in the sum of $2,500.00, the notice of 
motion in which was turned over to the defendant which at 
o·nce denied liability to plaintiff on the ground that the plain-
tiff's driver was violating the Ia,v as to driving licenses. The 
plaintiff thereupon defended the action brought by Edward 
Reid and a verdict was rendered in its favor by the Circuit 
Court of the City of Portsmouth, in which case the plaintiff's 
truck operator's competency as a driver was not questioned 
either in the pleadings or evidence, nor . was his failure to 
have a chauffeur's permit questioned or asserted as an act 
of negligence. The plaintiff's expenses in and about its neces-
~ary defense in the action brought by Edward Reid amounted 
to $HOO.OO, and to recover that of the defendant this action 
was brought. , 
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THE QUESTION INVOLVED. 
The question presented is: TVhether the operation of an 
automobile by a co1npetent en~ployee, without a chauffeur's 
pe1·mit, on a single trip, in an e-mergency, on which an acci-
dent occurs without the ernployee' s fa'ltlt or negligence and 
for which a suit is brought resu,ltin.q in a verdict favorable 
to the assured and in which co1npetency of the assured's 
driver, or his failure to have a cha·z~ff eur' s permit, is ques-
tioned neither in the pleadi.ngs nor evideMe, relieves the in-
surer of liability for the expen-se of defense of litigation inci-
dent thereto where the insurer in its policy pr'ovides against 
liability for loss o·r da·mage while the auto1nobile is being 
driven in violation of law as to driving license, but such vio-




The plaintiff contends that, even if it is expressed in the 
policy that there is no liability on the Company (Defendant) 
for loss or damage, this does not relieve the company (De-
fendant) of the duty to defend any suit brought against the 
assured, because the expense of litigation is neither ''loss 
nor damage" within the meaning· of the provisions of the 
policy; in fact the obligation of the policy is to defend suits 
of any nature, even though they be groundless or fraudulent, 
so that the necessity for defending litigation and paying th<' 
expenses incident thereto is not an exception of the policy. 
but is an express obligation thereof. 
Aside from this, however, there is no reason why there 
should be an escape from liability, even if the expense of 
litigation is within the exceptions in the policy, where the 
failure to have a driver's license is neither the proximate 
nor the remote cause of the accident, nor the litigation. It 
is a violation of law for a chauffeur not to display his chauf-
feur's badge on his cap or lapel, and there is just as much 
reason for holding that this would be ground for denial of 
liability under the policy as there is for denial of liability 
in this case. Liability insurance is a matter of public concern 
and it has been so often decided that unreasonable provisions 
of·, the policy will not be upheld as valid and binding that no 
citation is needed to support the statement. Indeed the ques-
tion of requirement of a chauffeur's permit is one for the 
State, and, while it may be possible to contract with reference 
..., 
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thereto, where it is the cause of a liability under the policy, 
which a number of the Courts have expressly denied, there is 
no reason for holding that the insurer should escape its lia-
bility in a case in which the ground on which it seeks to es-
cape is not an issue and cannot be made so, as is admitted 
in this case. The defendant admits the competency of the 
plaintiff's driver. The verdict of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Portsmouth determines that he was not negligent. 
Where then can there be any reason for denial of the obli-
g·ation of the defendant to defray the cost of litigation espe-
cially when n~ither "loss nor damage'' is an issue, and there 
is no connection between the basis for the suit it is called upon 
to defend and the contract provision 7 
To· sustain the defendant's contention in this case will 
amount to a legal fraud and 'vrite into its policy, which it sells 
to its assured with every argument as to its efficacy, many 
~and various conditions and restriction which destroy the 
value of the policy sold and cause the assured to rest upon 
assurances which are non-existent. Such a construction 'vill 
amount to this: that if the driver's permit expired at twelve 
o'clock and he were on a journey ~t the time and an accident 
took place at twelve fifteen o'clock his employer would be 
ril';linsured; or, if the rear license tag were lost and the auto-
mobile were driven without knowledge thereof and an acci-
dent occurred at an intersection the Insurance Company 
would not be liable under the policy. 
Not only is plaintiff's contention impliedly upheld in Mary-
land Casualty Company v. Hoge, 153 Va. 204, but section 
4326 (a) of the Code as amended by the Acts of Assembly 
of 1934 h~s expressly outlawed the policy in question since 
its making. 
THE ARGUMENT, Continued. 
(The Authorities.) 
In Maryland CaS11,alty Company v. Hoge, 153 Va. 204, it 
was held: 
That the failure of the driver of an automobile to secure a 
driver's permit in compliance with an ordinance of the City 
of Roanoke did not relieve the insurer of liabilitv where the 
failure to have the permit did not contribute to the accident 
and the requirement of the policy required the use and opera-
tion of the automobile to be lawful. 
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Said the Court : 
''The authorities seem to be quite unanimous in holding 
that failure to observe traffic regulations is no defense unless 
such failure was the proximate cause of the injury. ·The fol-
lowing authorities sustain this proposition. 
''In the case of .llJ eM ahon v. P ea.rltnan, 242 Mass. 367, 136 
N. E. 154, 23 A. L. R. 1467, it was held that one operating 
an automobile on a public highway without a license, which 
act is a statutory crime, is not precluded by public policy 
from enforcing a policy indemnifying him against bodily in-
jury inflicted by use of the automobile. 
''The policy in the above case expressly exempted the in-
surer from liability for injury or death caused by the auto-
mobile ·while being operated by any person in violation of 
· the law with reference to age, and if there 'vas no legal age 
limit, by a'lly one under the age of sixteen, or while engaged 
in any racing or competitive speed test. The accident hap-
pened while the insured was driving her car, she having no 
legal permit or authority to drive the same. The insurer 
claimed that while the act was not specifically forbidden in 
the policy, yet, the insured was violating the law, and, there-
fore, for reasons of public policy, the company should not 
be held liable in damages. The court held, after a full dis-
cussion of the authorities, that the unlawful act of Mrs. Pearl-
man did not constitute a defense unless it was a direct and 
proximate cause of the injury." 
In Jltlessers1nith v . .Amer·ican Fidelity Oomp(JJYty, 232 N. Y. 
161, 133 N. E. 432, 19 A. L. R. 876, it was held: 
"That defendant was liable under the policy even though 
the use of the automobile at the time of the accident was in 
violation of the highway la,v.'' 
• • • • • 
In Rowe v. United Com/mercial Travele1·s of America, 186 
Ia. 454, 172 N. ,V. 454, 4 .A .. L. R. 1235, 1236, it was held: 
"Under a provistion of an accident insurance policy that 
it shall not extend to or cover any death, disability or loss 
·resulting from the violation of any law, the mere fact that 
at the time of injury insured was driving an automobile at a 
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speed which the statute declares to be presumptively negli-
gent, for which it provides punishment, does not prevent re-
covery, but it must in addition be established that the injury 
was caused by or resulted from such violation of law." 
• 
In Hoss~ey v. f!nion Indem,. Co. (1925), 137 Miss. 537, 102 
So. 561, it was held: that for an exclusion clause providing 
that the policy does not cover while the car is "being driven 
in violation of law as to age, or if there be no age limit, under 
the ag·e of sixteen years'', to relieve insurer from liability 
for an injury to the car by collision with another car while 
being driven by a person under the age of sixteen years, there 
must have been some causal connection between the driving 
of the car and the injury to it. 
The plaintiff in error does not contend that there is no 
authority to the contrary, but the better considered cases 
are in accord with the contention of the plaintiff in error 
that there must be causal connection between the violation 
of the law and the accident; indeed many cases go far enough 
to say that the violation of the law must be the proximate 
cause of the a.ccident. 
Terry v. Nat'l 1l1.otor Underwriters (supra), 244 TIL App. 
241. 
Mannheirner Bros. v. Kansas Casualty and s~wety Co., 147 
Minn. 350, 180 N. W. 229. 
Pawlicki v. Hollenbeck, etc., Ins. Co., 22 N. Vv. 626. 
McMahon v. Pearlmam,, supra, 242 :hiass. 367. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Holey, 1.29 :hiiss. 525, 92 So. 635, 
23 A. L. R. 1470. 
That this is unquestionably the trena of the cases as shown 
in the recently decided cases of Washington Fidelity Nat. 
Ins. Co. v. Herbert (Ohio), 195 N. E. 492, in which the Court 
said: 
''It is next claimed that the court erred in refusing to give 
special charges before argument, requested by the insurance 
company. These charges were refused, and correctly so, for 
the reason that they failed to state any causal connection o£ 
intoxication or violation of the law with the accident which 
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caused the death of Herbert. The charges are based on the 
proposition that under the terms of the policy it is immaterial 
whether there is any causal connection between the intoxica-
tion, or violation of the law, and the accident, the cause of 
the death. This construction would amount to this, that if the 
insured had lost his rear license tag, and was driving his 
car without knowledge of that fact, and a collision occurred 
at an intersection, the insurance company 'vould not be liable 
under the policy; or, if the insured was in an intoxicated 
condition and was struck by lightning the company would not 
be liable under the terms of the policy. We cannot accede 
to such a construction. If this construction sought by the 
company were sustained, it ·would amount to legal fraud. 
The courts will not construe a contract in a way that will pro-
duce such a result.'' 
See also Tennenbau1n v. State A1do1nobile Mutual Insur-
. ance Assn. (Ohio), 183 N. E. 79. 
The competency of the plaintiff's driver being admitted, 
the failure of the driver to have a chauffeur's permit having 
had no connection with the accident for 'vhich the plaintiff 
was sued, the plaintiff's driver being guilty of no negligence 
as a matter of law and his failure to have a chauffeur's per-
mit not being called into question in the case of Edward 
Reid v. plaintiff, either in the pleadings or evidence, and 
the driver being· used in an emergency, no just reason is 
perceived why the defendant should escape liability on an 
exclusion clause having to do with "losses or damage" and 
not with the expenses of or the duty to defend litigation how-
ever f1·audulent, false or grou.ndless. 
(This petition is hereby adopted as the opening brief; and 
counsel for petitioner desires to state orally the reasons for 
reviewing the error and judgn1ent complained of.) 
(A copy of this petition has been mailed to Rixey & Rixey, 
Law Building, Norfolk, Virginia, counsel for plaintiff in the 
trial court, the date of mailing being July 30th, 1935.) 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in enter-
ing up judgment for plaintiff for the reasons set forth in 
the assignment of error and as further stated in this petition. 
Your petitioner, therefore, nrays that a writ of error be 
granted it; that the judgment complained of may be reviewed, 
8 S~preme Court of Appeals of Vir~a. 
and that such judg·ment be entered as said court should have 
entered. 
And your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
HOLLAND SU.PPLY CORPORATION, 
By Counsel. 
THO~IAS L. WOODvV ARD, 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
We, Hugh L. Holland and Thomas L. Woodward, counsel 
practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do 
certify that in our opinion the judgment complained of in 
the foregoing petition should be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Given under our hands this 29th day of July, 1935. 
Received July 30, 1935. 
HUGH L. HOLLAND, 
THOS. L. WOODWARD.· 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Writ of error allowed. Bond $300. 
EDW. W. HUDGINS. 
Sept. 4, 1935. 
Rec 'd September 4, 1935. 
M. B. WATTS. 
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page 2 ~ VIRGINIA: 
PLEAS before the Circuit Court of Nansemond County, 
at the Courthouse of said County on the 31st day of J anu-
ary, 1935. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, That heretofore, to-wit: · In the 
Clerk's ·Office of the Circuit Court of Nansemond County on 
the 7th day of August, 1934, came Holland Supply Corpora-
tion, by their attorney, and filed theh~ Notice of Motion against 
Holland Supply Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 9 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, in the 
words and figures following: 
Virginia: 1 I 
In the Circuit Court of Nansemond ·County. 
Holland Supply Corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
State Farm M:utual Automobile Insurance Company, De-
fendant. 
To State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company: 
You are hereby notified that the undersigned, Holland Sup-
ply Corporation, will move the Circuit Court of N ansemond 
County on the 20th day ·of August, 1934, at 10:00 o'clock, 
.A.. M., or as soon thereafter as the same may be heard, for 
judgment against you in the sum of $300.00, with legal in-
terest thereon from J'uly 23rd, 1934, until paid, the same 
being due from you to Holland Supply Corporation, for this, 
to-wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit: On the 14th day of March, 1934, 
you did enter into a certain contract of indemnity 
page 3 ~ with Holland Supply Corporation, ,the original of 
which contract is your #270218-Va, and is filed 
with the original notice of motion in this cause, wherein you 
agreed to defend all actions and pay, indemnify, save harm-
less, and bear all costs, expenses, and damages occasioned 
to Holland Supply Corporation by reason of its liability for 
personal injury and. property damage occasioned to any other 
person by the operation of a certain Chevrolet light truck, 
serial #880114, for the period of one-half year from March 
14th, 1934, thence ensuing, yet -notwithstanding that while 
said contract was in full force and effect claim was made 
against Holland Supply Corporation by Edward Reid and 
subsequent action brought thereabout against Holland Sup-
ply Corporation in the Circuit Court of the City of Ports-
mouth, "Therein Edward Reid claimed and alleged ·certain 
bodily injuries occasioned to him on, to-wit: May 8th, 1934, 
through the operation of said truck, of which due, timely 
and adequate notice was given you, you did fail and refuse 
to defend te said action or to furnish counsel therefor or·to 
pay the cost of expenses necessary to the defense thereof, snch 
that Holland Supply Corporation was compelled to employ 
counsel and expend divers sums of money, to-wit: $300.00, 
v 
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in investigation, preparation and trial of the aforesaid case, 
which case was tried and ended in a manner favorable to 
Holland Supply Corporation, whereby, and by reason where-
of, judgment will be asked in the sum notified, together with 
reasonable counsel fees required to enforce this indemnity. 
page 4 ~ HOLLAND SUPPLY CORP., 
By Counsel. 
TH011:AS L. WOODWARD, p. q. 
And afterwards, to-wit: Plea of General Issue filed in the 
Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of N ansemond Countv on 
the 13th day of August, 1934. "' 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Nansemond County. 
Holland Supply Corporation 
v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 
PLEA OF GENERAL ISSUE. 
The defendant, State Farm ~{utual Automobile Insurance 
Company, by its attorneys, comes and says that it did not 
undertake o:P promise in any manner and form as the plain-
tiff hath in this action complained. And of this the said 
defendants put himself upon the Country. 
C. C. SHARP, 
RIXEY & RIXEY, 
p. d. 
page 5 ~ And afterwards, to-wit: Agreed Statement of 
Fa<?ts filed the 31st day of January, 1935. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Nansemond County. 
IIolland Supply Corporation 
v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. 
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AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Holland Supply Corporation, the plaintiff, and State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (herein called the 
insurance company), the defendant, through their attorneys, 
have agreed the facts in this case as follows: 
At all times hereinafter mentioned plaintiff was the owner 
of a certain automobile truck which it used about its busi-
ness. The plaintiff was likewise the owner of that certain 
poilc~ of insurance which is hereto attached and made a part 
of this agreed statement of facts, ·covering the aforesaid 
truck, and in which the plaintiff was the insured and the de-
fendant the insurer. On May 8th, 1934, while said policy was 
in force plaintiff caused said truck to be driven about its 
business on the public streets of the City of Portsmouth, Vir .. 
ginia, by one, Ruben vV arren, who was then and there the 
servant of the plaintiff in so driving, and a resident and 
citizen of the State of Virginia. That on said last mentioned 
day while said truck was being so operated and 
page 6 ~ driven by said Ruben Warren, one Edward Reid 
was injured in and about his person, which injury 
the said Edward Reid claimed was caused by the negligent op-
eration of said truck by said Ruben Warren. Thereafter said 
Edward Reid brought an action in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Portsmouth against said Holland Supply Corpora-
tion to recover the sum of Twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,-
!>00.00) for the aforesaid injury. 
Due notice of the said accident and action were given to 
the insurance company by said Holland Supply Corporation, 
upon the reecipt of which said insurance company, promptly 
caused an investig·ation to be made, through which investi-
gation it discovered the following facts, which are the facts; 
that the said Ruben Warren, at the time of the aforesaid in-
jury to said Edward Reid, had not been licensed as an op-
erator or chauffeur by the Division of Motor Vehicles of the 
State of Virginia, nor had he ever made application for such 
license. nor bad any instruction permit or temporary driver's 
permit or any other kin~ of permit been issued ~o ~i~ by the 
Division of Motor Vehicles of the State of VIrginia. The. 
lack of permit on the part of .Ruben Warren wa~ known ~o 
said Holland Supply Corporation when the operation of said 
truck was entrusted to him. 
Thereupon said insurance company promptly notified said 
Holland Supply Corporatio~ that it denied c_?verage for th.e 
said aooident because the sa1d truck at the time. ~f ~h~ acci-
dent was being driven in violation of law as to driving hcense, 
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and that the insurance company would not defend 
page 7 ~ the said action. 
Thereupon said I-Iolland Supply Corporation em-
ployed its own counsel and defended the action, resulting in 
a verdict and judgment in favor of, the said Holland Supply 
Corporation. The expenses incurred by Holland Supply Cor-
poration in the defense of said action amount to $300.00. 
Ruben Warren is 30 years old and at the time of the ac-
cident had worked for plaintiff, Holland Supply Corporation, 
off and on for about five years. His regular duties were to do 
labor around the plaintiff's ·warehouse. The plaintiff had 
another employee whose regular duties were to drive the 
truck, which was the only truck owned by the plaintiff. On 
occasions when the regular driver was sick or not available 
for any reason, Rube11 Warren was entrusted by the plaintiff 
with the driving, which was the situation at the time of the 
accident. Ruben Warren had been driving automobiles and 
trucks for at least twelve years and was a competent driver. 
In the action of Edward Reid v. Holla·nd 81t.p1Jly Cm·po·ration, 
Ruben Warren's competency as a driver was not questioned 
either in the pleadings or the evidence, nor \Vas his failure 
to have a chauffeur's permit questioned or asserted as an act 
of negligen~e. 
STATE FAR~I lviUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE CO~iP ANY. 
By RIXEY AND RIXEY, 
Its Attorneys. 
HOLLAND SUPPLY CORPORATION. 
By THOS. L. WOODWARD, 
Its Attorney. 
page 8 ~ And afterwards, to-wit: Order entered in the 
Circuit Court of N ansemond County on the 31st 
day of January, 1935. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of N ansen1ond County. 
Holland Supply Corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
State Farm !futual Automobile Insurance Company, De-
fendant. 
Thi~ day came the parties, by counsel, and having agreed 
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upon the facts and neither party requiring a jury, but ex-
pressly waiving the same, the whole matter of law and fact 
was submitted to the Court for its consideration and deter-
mination. 
It is therefore considered by the Court that the plaint~ff 
is not entitled to recover of the defendant and doth award 
defendant its costs herein expended to which action of the 
Court the plaintiff excepted on the ground that the same is 
contrary to the law and the agreed facts, and having indi-
cated its intention to present to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals a petition for a writ of error and supersedeas to this 
judgment it is ordered that when the plaintiff, or someone· 
for it, shall give bond, with surety, before the Clerk of this 
Court in the penalty of $100.00, conditioned according to 
law, execution of this judgment shall be suspended for sixty 
days from the date of the entering of this order. 
pag·e 9 ~ CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, John H. Powell, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Nansemond 
County, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing is a true 
transcript of the record in the case of Holland Supply Cor-
poration, plaintiff, v~ State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company, defendant, lately pending in said Court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the defendant had received rea-
sonable notice thereof and of the intention of the plaintiff 
to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a 
writ of error and S'ltpersedeas to the judgment therein. 
JOHN H. POWELL, 
Clerk, Circuit Court of N ansemond County, 
Virginia. 
page 10 ~ I, James L. McLemore, Judge of the Circuit 
Court of N ansemond County, presided over the 
foregoing trial of Holland Supply Corporation v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and do certify that 
the foregoing· is a true and correct copy or report of all the 
facts and other incidents of this cause tried in the Circuit 
Court of N ansemond County on the 21st day of January, 
1935, except exhibit No. 1, the original of which is identified 
by my signature and it is agreed by counsel for plaintiff and 
defendant that in lieu of certifying a copy of this exhibit re-
ferred to as part of the foregoing copy of record the original 
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shall be transmitted by the Clerk of this Court to the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court of Appeals. 
And I further certify that the defendant in this case had 
reasonable notice, in writing, of the time and place when the 
record, agreed facts, and other incidents of the trial would 
be tendered and presented to the undersigned for verifica-
tion. 
Given under my l1and this 1st day of April, 1935, within 
60 days of the time when judgment in this case was ren-
dered. 
JAMES L. McLEMORE, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Nanse-
mond County. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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